

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON**

TO US DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
BORIS PETRENKO
AND ALL OTHER RELATED PARTIES
AND TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT

LEGAL BRIEF AS TO MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS

ISSUES PRESENTED

1. Since the Defendant was not properly read his *Miranda* rights in his own language due to an unknown or possibly unqualified interpreter was the interrogation and / or search and

1 seizure by the postal inspector a violation of the defendant's rights under the State and
 2 US Constitutions?

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4 2. Should the court suppress evidence gathered illegally when the Defendant was never
 5 informed in his own language nor ever gave consent for the conversation and any
 6 possible search and seizure to be recorded?

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10 BRIEF STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

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On or about October 21, 2020, the defendant was interrogated by a postal inspector with the use of the postal inspector's own interpreter. That interpreter's name is not known nor is her contact information to the defense at this time. That interrogation was recorded. In the beginning the postal inspector said it is being recorded but the interpreter did not translate this to the defendant. Also, during the interrogation, at some times during the interrogation, the translator either did not translate information to the defendant or did not translate to English what the defendant had stated. Also the credentials of the translator are not yet known. The defense is now moving to suppress any statements by the defendant since it appears that his rights may not have been interpreted to him correctly and the defendant did not know or was not properly notified that the conversation was being recorded.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

1. Since the Defendant was not properly read his *Miranda* rights in his own language due to an unknown or possibly unqualified interpreter was the interrogation and / or search and seizure by the postal inspector a violation of the defendant's rights under the State and US Constitutions? Yes.

A defendant's statements, made in response to custodial interrogation by police, are not admissible unless the State "demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self- incrimination." *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Custodial interrogation occurs when an agent of the state asks the

1 defendant a question, while in custody, that is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
 2 response. *State v. Walton*, 64 Wn.App. 410, 824 P.2d 533 (1992).

3 A suspect who has been advised of his *Miranda* rights against self-incrimination may
 4 waive the rights, provided the waiver is made knowingly and intelligently. *Miranda v. Arizona*,
 5 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966). The defense in this case also cites State authorities as
 6 persuasive evidence for purposes of these motions. The State must establish that the defendant
 7 was fully advised of his rights, understood them, and knowingly and intelligently waived them.
 8 *State v. Terrovona*, 105 Wn.2d 632, 646, 716 P.2d 295 (1986); *State v. Reuben*, 62 Wn.App. 620,
 9 625, 814 P.2d 1177, review denied, 118 Wn.2d 1006 (1991).

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 11 The State has the burden of proving that a defendant has made a knowing, voluntary and
 12 intelligent waiver of his or her *Miranda* rights. Whether a confession is voluntary and therefore
 13 admissible is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances. *State v. Wolfer*, 39
 14 Wn.App. 287, 290, 693 P.2d 154 (1984), review denied, 103 Wn.2d 1028 (1985) (citing Davis v.
 15 North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741-42, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 1764-65 (1966)). A valid waiver may be
 16 either expressly made or implied when the record reveals that the “defendant understood his
 17 rights and volunteered information after reaching such understanding.” *State v. Terrovona*, 105
 18 Wn.2d 632, 646 (1986).

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 20 A waiver may be inferred when “the record shows that a defendant's answers were freely
 21 and voluntarily made without duress, promise or threat and with a full understanding of his
 22 constitutional rights.” *Terrovana*, 105 Wn.2d at 647. Validity of a waiver of rights during
 23 interrogation depends upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case,
 24 including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. *State v. Whitaker*, 133
 25 Wn.App. 199 (2006). Inebriation is a factor that courts consider when determining whether
 MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS - 3

1 defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights; inebriation is not dispositive of the issue. *State*
 2 *v. Saunders*, 120 Wn.App. 800 (2004). The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
 3 that the confession was voluntary. *State v. Cushing*, 68 Wn.App. 388, 393, 842 P.2d 1035 (1993)
 4 (*citing State v. Ng*, 110 Wn.2d 32, 37, 750 P.2d 632 (1988)).

5 The Washington State legislature has expressed an intent that non-English speakers be
 6 read legal rights and warnings in their native language:

7 It is hereby declared to be the policy of this state to secure the rights,
 8 constitutional or *otherwise*, of persons who, because of a non-English-speaking
 9 cultural background, are unable to readily understand or communicate in the
 10 English language, and who consequently cannot be fully protected in legal
 11 proceedings unless qualified interpreters are available to assist them. RCW
 12 2.43.010

13 Courts have likewise recognized the importance of ready interpreters to ensure that non-
 14 English speakers fully understand their rights and the proceedings against them: “The
 15 Washington Courts are committed to ensuring equal access to justice for all individuals
 16 regardless of their ability to communicate in the spoken English language.” Washington State
 17 Court Interpreter Program, http://www.courts.wa.gov/programs_orgs/pos_interpret/ (last visited
 18 July 24, 2019). *Also see, In re Pers. Restraint of Khan*, 184 Wn.2d at 689 (lead opinion) (citing
 19 RCW 2.43.010, .030, .040(2); *State v. Gonzales-Morales*, 138 Wn.2d 374, 379, 979 P.2d 826
 20 (1999)). “The purpose of [the statutory procedures at] RCW 2.43 is to uphold the constitutional
 21 rights of non-English speaking persons.” *State v. Aquino-Cervantes*, 88 Wn. App. 699, 706, 945
 22 P.2d 767 (1997). In Washington, a criminal defendant's right to an interpreter is based on the
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 24 MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS - 4

1 Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses and ““the right inherent in a fair trial to be present
 2 at one's own trial.”” *Gonzales-Morales*, 138 Wn.2d at 379 (quoting *State v. Woo Won Choi*, 55
 3 Wn. App. 895, 901, 781 P.2d 505 (1989)).

4 The interpreter issue also presents right to counsel issues pursuant to CrR 3.1. Pursuant
 5 to CrR 3.1 and *State v. Prok*, 107 Wn.2d 153, 727 P.2d 652 (1986), a suspect is to be informed of
 6 his/her right to counsel upon being taken into custody and in “words easily understood.” This
 7 also applies to *State vs. Ferrier* rights. The Washington Supreme Court extended this principal
 8 to implied consent warnings read after a DUI arrest, holding that the State failed to prove that a
 9 subject who was a native Spanish speaker was read the implied consent warnings at all, let alone
 10 in a comprehensible manner, when the only testimony at trial was inadmissible hearsay
 11 testimony that the officer heard the interpreter read the warnings to the defendant in Spanish, but
 12 the officer, who did not speak Spanish, was unable to testify as to what exactly was read. *State v.*
 13 *Morales*, 173 Wn.2d 560, 573-74, 269 P.3d 263, 271 (2012).

15 Moreover, the *Morales* Court determined, the trooper would have known the warnings
 16 were read only if the interpreter had told him that they were read, but that this statement would
 17 be classic hearsay, and likewise inadmissible, unless the testimony is *not* offered for the truth of
 18 the matter asserted *or* the interpreter is an agent of the declarant. *Id.*, citing *State v. Phu V.*
 19 *Huynh*, 49 Wn. App. 192, 203, 742 P.2d 160 (1987); *State v. Garcia-Trujillo*, 89 Wn. App. 203,
 20 204-05, 948 P.2d 390 (1997). Because the only testimony regarding the warnings came from the
 21 trooper, the Court determined that the State had not proven that the warnings had been provided
 22 to Mr. Morales, and that the blood test results were admitted in error. *Id.* at 577.

23 Similarly, in *State v. Huynh*, 49 Wn. App. 192, 742 P.2d 160 (1987), the defendant, who
 24 spoke only Vietnamese, was interviewed by an officer through defendant’s ex-girlfriend’s niece,
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and the officer testified to the content of Mr. Huynh's answers at trial over defense counsel's
 1 objection. The Court relied on its decision in *State v. Lopez*, 29 Wn. App. 836, 631 P.2d 420
 2 (1981) to resolve *Huynh*. In *Lopez*, Division One found that a victim's description of his
 3 assailant that was translated by his friend for the officer, and to which the officer testified at trial
 4 when neither the victim nor the translator was available for cross-examination was inadmissible
 5 hearsay. *Lopez*, 29 Wn. App. at 839. The *Lopez* Court reasoned that a witness is not competent to
 6 testify as to extrajudicial statements made by another if it is necessary to have those statements
 7 translated prior to the witness' testimony, because the witness is relying on the interpreter's
 8 assertion of what the other party said. *Id.* In other words, testimony that "is based upon the
 9 translation alone rather than an understanding of the declarant's own words" is not admissible.
 10 *Huynh*, 49 Wn. App. at 203, citing Note, *Criminal Law/Evidence -- Admissibility of Third-Party*
 11 *Testimony on Out-of-Court Statements Made to a Witness Through an Interpreter -- Chao v.*
 12 *State*, 478 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1985), 14 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 372 (1986). "The testimony is admissible
 13 only if it is not offered for the truth of the matters asserted or the interpreter is an agent or
 14 authorized to speak for the declarant." *Id.* citing 29 Am. Jur. 2d *Evidence* § 501, at 558 (1967).
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With the *Lopez* case as controlling precedent, the *Huynh* Court found that the record
 17 demonstrated that the interpreter in that case was not an agent for the appellant, and that the
 18 translation of the appellant's statements was offered for the truth of their content. *Huynh*, 49 Wn.
 19 App. at 203. Thus, the officer's testimony was hearsay and not admissible under any exception to
 20 the hearsay rule and should have been excluded. *Id.* at 203-4.

Likewise, during court proceedings, when the sufficiency of an interpreter's efforts is
 22 called into question, the inquiry focuses on whether the rights of the non-English speaking
 23 person have been protected. *State v. Ramirez-Dominguez*, 140 Wn. App. 233, 244, 165 P.3d 391
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1 (2007); *State v. Teshome*, 122 Wn. App. 705, 712, 94 P.3d 1004 (2004), review denied, 153
 2 Wn.2d 1028 (2005).

3 Rather than adopting its own standard of review for this issue, Washington Court have
 4 borrowed from federal case law, which looks to trial court records for instances where the
 5 defendant reportedly could not understand the interpreter or answered questions inappropriately.
 6 *Ramirez-Dominguez*, 140 Wn. App. at 245-246 and *Teshome*, 122 Wn. App. at 712, both citing
 7 *Perez-Lastor v. Immigration & Naturalization Service*, 208 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2000); *Amadou v.*
 8 *Immigration & Naturalization Service*, 226 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2000).

9 *Teshome* additionally discussed a four-factor test presented in *United States v.*
 10 *Cirrincione*, 780 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1985). *Teshome*, 122 Wn. App. at 712-713:

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 12 (1) what is told [the defendant] is incomprehensible; (2) the accuracy and scope
 13 of a translation at a hearing or trial is subject to grave doubt; (3) the nature of the
 14 proceeding is not explained to him in a manner designed to ensure his full
 15 comprehension; or (4) a credible claim of incapacity to understand due to
 16 language difficulty is made and the district court fails to review the evidence and
 17 make appropriate findings of fact. *Id.* (citing *Cirrincione*, 780 F.2d at 634).

18 Each of these factors depends on record-based evidence of significant communication
 19 difficulties between defendant and interpreter. The Court should be guided by the foregoing case
 20 law as well as the relating federal rules in comparison to State Rule CrR 3.1 and *State v. Prok*,
 21 107 Wn.2d 153, 727 P.2d 652 (1986), which require that a suspect be informed of his/her right to
 22 counsel in “words easily understood.”

1 In the case of this defendant Mr. Lei, the interpreter in the recording is not known and it
 2 is not shown what her credentials are as far as qualifications to interpret. We do not know if she
 3 is court certified or not. Also, at times in the recording she has a conversation with the defendant
 4 instead of just interpreting. She also did not interpret to Mr. Lei who the postal inspector was
 5 and she did not translate to the inspector that the conversation was being recorded. It appears
 6 that the *Miranda* rights were not thoroughly interpreted as well. The defendant mainly speaks
 7 Cantonese where the translator spoke in the dialect of Mandarin. Therefore, the defense moves
 8 to suppress any statements or evidence found as a result of the statements in this case.

9 2. Should the court suppress evidence gathered illegally when the Defendant was never
 10 informed in his own language nor ever gave consent for the conversation and any
 11 possible search and seizure to be recorded? – Yes.

12 In order for an analyses on the law on this issue, both state and federal laws are reviewed.
 13 Pursuant to RCW [9.73.030](#), Washington state is a two party state for recorded conversations. An
 14 exception is allowed for officers for custodial questioning but they must let the Defendant know
 15 it is being recorded. RCW 10.122.040. Also, under federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 only
 16 requires **one-party to consent**, which means a person can record a phone call or conversation so
 17 long as they are a party to the conversation. If they are not a party to the conversation, they can
 18 record a conversation or phone call only if at least one party consents and has full knowledge
 19 that the communication will be recorded.

20 According to the recording, the postal inspector mentioned that the conversation was
 21 being recorded. This, however, was never translated to the Defendant in any language. Also,
 22 there was no consent by the *interpreter* to have the conversation recorded. Therefore, the postal
 23 inspector was in violation of the above mentioned statutes and all evidence as a result of this
 24 interrogation should be suppressed and the case dismissed.

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2 CONCLUSION
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4 Since the defendant was not read his Miranda rights in his own native language and since
5 he was not informed that the conversation was being recorded, the defense moves to suppress all
6 the evidence in this case including any evidence as a result of the illegal recording of the
interrogation of the defendant.

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8 Dated this 27TH of May 2022

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10 
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12 Attorney for the Defendant
WENQUAN LEI